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LEAD ARTICLES

International Crisis and
Neutrality: United States Foreign
Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War
by Francis A. Boyle*

Prescript

This Article was written in 1986 and submitted to the University of
New Orleans Symposium on Neutrality. The Article reflects the author's
analysis regarding the United States military intervensionism into the
Middle East with a special focus on the Persian Gulf region. The author
analyzes the United States' policies to divide-and-conquer the Arab oil
Professor of International Law, University of Illinois College of Law, Champaign, Illinois. University of Chicago (A.B., 1971); Harvard Law School (J.D., magna cum laude,
1976); Harvard University (A.M., 1978 and Ph.D. 1983). Before joining the faculty at Illinois
in 1978, he was a Teaching Fellow in Harvard's Department of Government (1976-78), an
Associate of Harvard's Center for International Affairs (1976-78), and an attorney with the
Boston law firm of Bingham, Dana, and Gould in Boston (1977-78) in tax and international
*

tax. His publications include the award-winning WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1985); DEFENDING Civu. RESISTANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987); and THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

(1989).
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fields that orginated as early as in the 1973 Arab oil boycott of Europe.
The body of the Article traces the historical developments leading into
the Reagan Administration's own foreign policies toward the Iran-Iraq
War. Following the body of the Article, the author then. continues an
analysis of the United States' role in the Middle East in the Postcript.
The board of editors has decided to reprint the Article at this time because it provides important historical background to the Iran-Iraq War
that is necessary to analyze the United States War against Iraq.
-Editors
I.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES NEUTRALITY
POLICIES

On the domestic level, current United States neutrality legislation
dates back to the first Neutrality Act of June 5, 1794,1 which expired after two years, was renewed in 1797 for two more years,2 and was permanently enacted by an Act of April 20, 1818.8 Sections 1 through 6 of the
1818 Act made the following acts crimes: (1) for an American citizen
within United States territory to accept and exercise a commission in the
military forces of a foreign government engaged in a war against another
foreign government with which the United States was at peace; (2) for
any person within United States territory to enlist or to procure the enlistment of another person, or proceed beyond United States territory
with the intent to be enlisted in the forces of a foreign sovereign, subject
to a proviso for transient foreigners; (3) for any person in United States
territory to fit out and arm a vessel for the purpose of engaging in hostilities on behalf of a foreign sovereign against another foreign sovereign
with which the United States was at peace; (4) for any United States citizen outside United States territory to fit out and arm a vessel of war for
the purpose of committing hostilities on United States citizens or their
property; (5) for any person within United States territory to increase or
augment the force of foreign armed vessels at war with another foreign
government with which the United States was at peace, and finally; (6)
for any person in United States territory to set on foot any military expedition or enterprise against the territory of a foreign sovereign with which
the United States was at peace.' The 1818 Act authorized the President
to employ the land or naval forces or the militia to carry out its provi1. Neutrality Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381.
2.
3.

Act of March 2, 1797, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 497.
Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 88, 3 Stat. 447 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 967

(1988)).
4.

3 Stat. at 447-50, §§ 1-6.
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sions or to compel any foreign ship to depart from the United States
when so required by the laws of nations or treaty obligations.'
Historically, the United States government played a leading role in the
development of the international laws of neutrality by endeavoring to obtain general acceptance of its internal policy pronouncements on neutrality from the countries of Europe throughout the late eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. During this isolationist period, the
United States government anticipated being neutral in the event of another general war in Europe and, therefore, actively supported the institution of neutrality. For example, the aforementioned proscriptions of
United States domestic neutrality legislation and practice found their
way into the three great principles of the seminal 1871 Treaty of
Washington.'
The treaty between the United States and Great Britain led to a settlement of the famous "Alabama Claims" arising out of the latter's provision
of assistance to Confederate raiders during the American Civil War.' The
three rules of article 6 provided that:
A neutral government is boundFirst, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground
to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a power with

which it is at peace; and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war
as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part,
within such jurisdiction, to warlike use.
Secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its
ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for
the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms,

or the recruitment of men.
Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and, as
to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the fore-

going obligations and duties."
Although formulated with reference to a domestic armed conflict like the
United States Civil War, these three principles enunciated requirements
of customary international law concerning neutrality that were applicable
to an international armed conflict as well.
On the international level, the next major development in the institution of neutrality occurred when the First Hague Peace Conference of
1899 adopted a voeu that the second conference consider the question of
5. 3 Stat. at 447, 449, § 8.
6. Treaty of Washington, May 8, 1871, 17 Stat. 863, T.S. No. 133.
7. 17 Stat. at 863.
8. 17 Stat. at 863, 865.
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the rights and duties of neutrals in warfare.' Pursuant to that wish, the
Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 adopted the Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of
War on Land" and the Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers in Naval War." In addition, the 1907 Convention Relative to the Laying of Submarine Contact Mines protected neutral shipping," and-article 1 of the 1907 Convention Relative to Certain Restrictions on the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Maritime War contained
protections for neutral postal correspondence.' When the Great War in
Europe erupted in the summer of 1914, the United States was a party to
these four Hague Conventions." Since the time of that conflagration, the
two major 1'907 Hague neutrality conventions governing land and sea
warfare have been universally considered to enunciate the rules of customary international law on this subject and bind parties and nonparties
alike even today.
Taken as a whole, the laws of neutrality were designed to operate in a
system of international relations in which war was considered to be an
inescapable fact of international life, yet in which the outbreak of war,
even between major actors, did not automatically precipitate a total systemic war among all global powers. According to the laws of neutrality,
the conduct of hostilities by a belligerent was supposed to disrupt the
ordinary routine of international intercourse between neutral nationals
and the belligerent's enemy to the minimal extent required by the dictates of military necessity. s Such arrangements were intended to permit
the neutral power to stay out of the conflict and, at the same time, allow
its nationals to take advantage of international commerce and intercourse
with all belligerents.
9. Final Act of the International Peace Conference, July 29, 1899, reprintedin 1 AM. J.
L. 103, 106 (Supp. 1907).
10. Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in
Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540 [hereinafter War on Land
1907].
11. Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 545 [hereinafter Naval War].
12. Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2332, T.S. No. 541 [hereinafter Submarine Mines].
13. Convention Relative to Certain Restrictions With Regard to the Exercise of the
Right of Capture in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2396, 2408, T.S. No. 544
[hereinafter Capture in Naval War].
14. 36 Stat. at 2310, T.S. No. 540; 36 Stat. at 2415, T.S. No. 545; 36 Stat. at 2332, T.S.
No. 541; 36 Stat. at 2396, T.S. No. 544.
15. "Neutrals have the right to continue during war to trade with the belligerents, subject to the law relating to contraband and blockade. The existence of this right is universally
admitted, although on certain occasions it has been in practice denied." JOHN B. MooRz, 7 A
Digest of InternationalLaw 99-103 (1906).
INT'L
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The political and strategic dimensions of the international laws of neutrality were complicated because they operated upon the basis of a legal
fiction concerning the neutral government's reputed responsibility for intrinsically nonneutral acts committed by its citizenry against a belligerent
during wartime. Generally, a belligerent state could not hold a neutral
government accountable for the private activities undertaken by the neutral's citizens-even if they worked directly to the detriment of the belligerent's wartime security interests. The laws of neutrality were essentially
predicated upon Lockeian assumptions concerning the nature of government and its proper relationship to the citizen; namely, that the political
functions of government must impinge upon the private Affairs of the citizen to the least extent possible, especially in the economic realm, in
which the right to private property and its pursuit are deemed fundamental." Typical of this Lockeian attitude was the prohibition on the confiscation of private property found in article 46 of the Regulations annexed
to both the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions with Respect to the Laws
and Customs of War on Land.17 In the same category fell the futile attempts by the United States government at both the First and the Second Hague Peace Conferences to secure international agreement upon the
principle of immunity from capture and confiscation of noncontraband
private property during maritime warfare.18
Hence, the primary duty of a neutral government was to maintain strict
impartiality in its governmental relations with all belligerents. The laws
of neutrality, however, specifically denied that the neutral government
had any obligation to guarantee that its nationals conduct affairs with
belligerents in a similar fashion or in accordance with any but the most
rudimentary set of rules. For example, according to article 1 of the 1907
Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
and Persons in Case of War on Land, the territory of neutral powers was
"inviolable," 1" and under article 2 belligerents were "forbidden to move
troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power."' 0 A neutral power was not, however, required to
16. Francis A. Boyle, The Law of Power Politics, 4 U. ILL. L. F. 902, 936-37 (1980).
17. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1803, 1822, T.S. No. 403; War on Land 1907, supra note 10, 36 Stat. at 2277, 230607, T.S. No. 539.
18. JOSEPH H. CHOATE, THE Two HAGUE CONFERENCES 74-77 (1913); CALVIN D. DAVIS,
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 138-140, 171-72, 227-33
(1975); WILLIAM I. HULL, THE Two HAGUE CONFERENCES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 126-41 (1908); Charles H. Stockton, Would Immunity from Capture, During
War, of Non-offending PrivateProperty Upon the High Seas Be in the Interest of Civilization? AM. J. INT'L L. 930, 932-33 (Part 111907).

19. War on Land 1907, supra note 10, 36 Stat. at 2322, T.S. No. 540.
20. Id.
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do the following: (1) prevent the exportation or passage through its territory, on account of either belligerent, of arms, ammunition, or anything
useful to an army or navy; 1 and, (2) forbid or restrict the use, in behalf of
belligerents, "of telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy
apparatus belonging to it or to companies or private individuals.""12 These
two latter provisions only applied when all restrictive or prohibitive measures taken by a neutral power in regard to these matters were applied
uniformly to both belligerents and companies or individuals owning such
telecommunication facilities respecting this rule."3 The national of a neutral power would not compromise his neutrality by furnishing supplies or
loans to one of the belligerents, provided he did not reside in the territory
of the other belligerent or territory that it occupied, and that the supplies
did not come from these territories." Finally, article 10 made it clear that
it would not be considered a hostile act for a neutral power to take even
forcible measures to prevent violations of its neutrality.2
In a similar vein, according to article 1 of the 1907 Hague Convention
Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, belligerents were "bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral Powers
and to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral waters, from any act which
would, if knowingly permitted by any Power, constitute a violation of
neutrality.' 6 Also, under article 2, any act of hostility committed by belligerent warships in the territorial waters of a neutral power constituted a
violation of neutrality and was strictly forbidden.27 In return, article 6
provided that a neutral government could not supply warships, ammunition, or war materials of any kind to a belligerent under any circumstances.28 However, the neutral government was under no obligation to
"prevent the export or transit, for the use of either belligerent, of arms,
ammunitions, or, in general, of anything which could be of use to any
army or fleet." 29 Nevertheless, the neutral power must apply equally to

the two belligerents any "conditions, restrictions, or prohibitions made by
it in regard to the admission into its ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters, of belligerent war-ships or of their prizes."' 0 Finally, article 26 made
it clear that a neutral government's exercise of its rights under the con21.

War on Land 1907, supra note 10, 36 Stat. at 2323, ar. 7, T.S. No. 540.

22.

War on Land 1907, supra note 10, 36 Stat. at 2323, art. 8, T.S. No. 540.

23.
24.
25.

War on Land 1907, supra note 10, 36 Stat. at 2323-24, art. 9, T.S. No. 540.
War on Land 1907, supra note 10, 36 Stat. at 2326, art. 1, T.S. No. 540.
War on Land 1907, supra note 10, 36 Stat. at 2324, T.S. No. 540.

26, Naval War, supra note
27. Id.
28. Naval War, supra note
29. Naval War, supra note
30. Naval War, supra note

11, 36 Stat. at 2427, T.S. No. 545.
11, 36 Stat. at 2428, T.S. No. 545.
11, 36 Stat. at 2428, art. 7, T.S. No. 545.
11, 36 Stat. at 2428, art. 9, T.S. No. 545.
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vention could never be considered
an "unfriendly act" by any belligerent
31
that was a contracting power.
Historically, the United States government vigorously opposed international recognition of any provisions which would require neutral powers
to impose a mandatory embargo upon trade in contraband of war between neutral nationals and belligerents. The government opposed such
provisions for the express purpose of ensuring the economic well-being of
American citizens during a European war in which the United States expected to remain neutral.32 Contraband of war shipped by neutral nationals to a belligerent, however, was subject to capture and confiscation by
the offended belligerent. Nevertheless, the belligerent had to undertake
these actions in accordance with the laws of war at sea and the international law of prize. For this reason, these interrelated bodies of customary
international law contained important protections for the rights of neutrals during an international armed conflict.
I As a result of the failure by the Second Hague Peace Conference to
codify this international law of maritime warfare and prize, Great Britain
summoned a conference of representatives of the major maritime powers
of the world to meet in London at the end of 1908. These representatives
included Germany, the United States, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France,
Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Russia. The goal of this
conference was to determine the generally recognized principles of international law applicable to maritime warfare and national prize adjudications. This meeting resulted in the 1909 Declaration of London Concern3
ing the Laws of Naval War.
The Declaration of London built upon the foundations established by
an informal compromise on the codification of maritime warfare that was
proposed, but not adopted, at the Second Hague Peace Conference. At
the beginning of the first World War, the Declaration of London was generally considered the most authoritative enunciation of the customary international laws of maritime warfare applicable to belligerents in their
conduct of hostilities and by their respective national prize courts. 3 ' Its
provisions set forth substantial protections for the rights of neutral nationals that both sets of belligerents generally honored during the first
two years of the Great War.
31. Naval War, supra note 11, 36 Stat. at 2433, T.S. No. 545.
32. Barbara J. Frischholz & John M. Raymond, Lawyers Who EstablishedInternational
Law in the United States, 1776-1914, AM. J. INT'L L. 802, 806-07 (1982).
33. Declaration of London, Feb. 16, 1909, in 4 UNPERFECTED TREATIES OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 129 (Christian L. Wiktor ed., 1976).
34. JAMES BROWN ScoTT, THE DECLARATION OF LONDON FEBRUARY 26,1909 (1919); James
B. Scott, The Declaration of London of February 26, 1909, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 274 (1914).,
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Without the recognition of a status such as neutrality by international
law, nonbelligerents virtually would be compelled to choose sides in a war
to maintain political and economic relations with at least one set of belligerents. In theory, the neutral state had an economic disincentive to
participate in the war because its citizens could greatly prosper from only
moderately restricted international trade with all belligerents who would
be desperately in need of goods that could be purchased from nationals of
the neutral state. Conversely, a belligerent supposedly would not act to
violate the neutral's rights and those of its nationals to keep the neutral
from entering the war on the enemy's side. Another theory prevalent at
the time of the Second Hague Peace Conference held that since the number and strength of neutral states in a future war would be proportionately greater than those of belligerents, the community of neutral states
could enforce the laws of neutrality upon the belligerents."
In practice, however, these theories were undercut because each neutral's normal international trading patterns invariably worked to the
greater advantage of one set of belligerents during the war.3 Therefore,
the disadvantaged belligerent had to engage in a complicated cost-benefit
analysis to decide whether the greater harm was the continued sufferance
of this strategic disadvantage in trade or its termination through outright
destruction of the neutral commerce, the latter with the risk that the neutral power would eventually oppose the belligerent. Also, instead of acting
as part of some international community of neutrals, each neutral state
constantly assessed the relative advantages and disadvantages of maintaining its own neutrality, as opposed to belligerency on one side of the
war or the other, in accordance with quite selfish calculations of its own
vital national security interests. Unless guaranteed by treaty, the violation of one neutral's rights did not obligate another neutral to declare war
or even to undertake measures of retortion against the violator.
For example, the United States did not enter the first World War in
order to defend the international laws of neutrality in the abstract. Its
failure to consider the German invasions of either neutral Belgium or
neutral Luxemburg as a casus belli provides evidence of this. It was only
when Germany's gross and repeated violations of American citizens' neutral rights of trade and intercourse with Great Britain seriously interfered
with the United States' ability to engage in international commerce, resulting in the large-scale destruction of American lives and property, that
the United States government invoked the sacred cause of neutrality as
one of the primary justifications for its intervention into the war. The
35. Charles H. Stockton, The InternationalNaval Conference of London 1908-1909, 3
AM. J. INT'L L. 614 (1909).
36. Ethel C. Phillips, American Participationin Belligerent Commercial Controls 19141917, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 675 (1933).
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United States generally believed that the quality and quantity of violations against its neutral rights by the Allied Powers were of a nature and
purpose materially different from, and far less heinous than, those perpetrated by the Central Powers: destruction of property as opposed to destruction of life and property.
As the intensity of the war heightened, and the Allies imposed their
stranglehold over commerce shipped by nationals from the neutral
United States to Europe, the Central Powers took the position that the
American government was under an obligation to take affirmative measures to rectify the developing imbalance of trade in arms, munitions, and
supplies that United States nationals were successfully transporting to
the Allies but not to the Central Powers. However, the United States government was quite emphatic in its rejection of their complaint. If one
belligerent was militarily unable to secure the safe passage of neutral
commerce to its shores because of the misfortunes of war, that was not
the problem of the neutral government, which possessed the perfect right
under international law to permit its citizens to continue trading with the
militarily more powerful belligerent. For a neutral government to discriminate in favor of the weaker belligerent to compensate for the military
imbalance would constitute an unneutral act that could ultimately precipitate a declaration of war upon the weaker belligerent by the stronger
belligerent. Moreover, the United States argued that even if the neutral
government were to embargo all trade in contraband of war by its citizens
with both sets of belligerents, this affirmative departure from the normal
rules of neutral practice during the course of an ongoing war could com7
promise its neutrality.3
The United States government's insistence upon the international legal
right of its citizens to trade with the Allies no matter how unequal the
military situation appeared played a significant part in the Central Powers' decision to pursue their policy of waging unrestricted submarine warfare to destroy this vital neutral commerce, regardless of the international
laws of neutrality and the laws of war at sea. The United States government eventually responded by entering the war to secure those rights of
its nationals and thus uphold the international laws of neutrality and
armed conflict. Indeed, that was exactly how the European system of
public international law was supposed to operate before the foundation of
the League of Nations.
Resort to warfare by one state against another was universally considered to constitute the ultimate sanction for the transgressor's gross and
repeated violations of the victim's international legal rights. The United
States ultimately fought in the Great War precisely to vindicate the inter37.

William C. Morey, The Sale of Munitions of War, 10 AM. J.

INT'L

L. 467 (1916).
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national laws of neutrality. America's decision to abandon its neutrality
and enter the war on the side of the Allied Powers ineluctably spelled
defeat for the Central Powers. This proved to be the definitive and most
effective sanction for Germany's violation of the international laws of
neutrality.
Nevertheless, the incongruous suppositions underlying the international laws of neutrality could not withstand the rigors of twentieth century total warfare with its all-encompassing political, military, economic,
and propagandistic dimensions. The first World War demonstrated the
abject failure of the laws of neutrality to perform their intended purpose
of constricting the radius of the war. This tragic experience led many
American international lawyers, diplomats, and statesmen to the unavoidable conclusion that in the postwar world the international community
had to abandon neutrality as a viable concept of international law and
politics and instead create a system of international relations in which
some organization would be charged with the task of enforcing international law against recalcitrant nations.38 Henceforth, the international legal rights of one state must be treated as rights pertaining to all states.
National security could no longer be a matter of individual concern, but
rather must be a collective responsibility shared by the entire international community organized together. This line of reasoning induced
many powerful American international lawyers both in and out of government to support the creation of the League to Enforce Peace and later to
8
champion the foundation of the League of Nations. '
In the opinion of these international lawyers, the United States government must at last definitively repudiate its traditional policies of isolationism in peace and neutrality in war in order to become a formal participant in the new European and worldwide balance-of-power system.
Admittedly, this balance had been wrought by brute military force. Yet
its continued existence could be legitimized, if not sanctified, by the
adoption and effective enforcement of the principles of international law
set forth in the Covenant of the League of Nations. In this manner,
America's vital national security interests on the one hand, and its professed philosophical and moral ideals on the other, could most success38. Philip M. Brown, The Theory of the Independence and Equality of States, 9 AM. J.
L. 305 (1915); Malbone W. Graham, Neutrality and the World War, 17 AM. J. INT'L L.
704 (1923); Malbone W. Graham, Neutralizationas a Movement in InternationalLaw, 21
AM. J. INT'L L. 79 (1927); Amos S. Hershey, Projects Submitted to the American Institute
of InternationalLaw, 11 Am. J. INT'L L. 390 (1917); Elihu Root, The Outlook for International Law, 10 AM. J. INTL L. 1 (1916); Arthur W. Spencer, The Organization of International Force, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 45 (1915); George G. Wilson, Sanction for International
Agreements, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 387 (1917).
39. RUHL J. BARLETr, THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 215-18 (1944).
INT'L
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fully be reconciled and, indeed, would coincide and reinforce each other
by means of United States' membership in the League.
According to the then prevailing viewpoint, the creation of the League
of Nations was supposed to have sounded the deathknell for the institution of neutrality and thus for the international laws of neutrality. This
supposed watershed in international legal and political relations was
made quite clear by articles 10 and 11(1) of the League Covenant:
ARTICLE 10. The Members of the League undertake to respect and
preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of
any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression
the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be
fulfilled.
ARTICLE 11-1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a
matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any
action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of
nations. In case any such emergency should arise, the Secretary-General
shall on the request of 40
any Member of the League forthwith summon a
meeting of the Council.
Nevertheless, contemporaneous prognostications concerning the imminent demise of neutrality proved to be quite premature. This was because
the United States government never joined the League of Nations and
never became a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ"), due to strident opposition to both international
organizations consistently mounted by isolationist members of the United
States Senate and their supporters. Even the technical separation of the
court from the League by the device of adopting a Protocol of Signature
for the PCIJ Statute (which permitted nonLeague members to ratify the
latter without joining the League) was insufficient to induce the Senate
into giving its advice and consent to the Protocol on terms acceptable to
the covenant's contracting parties. Shorn of United States participation,
the League of Nations arrived into the world stillborn. So it came as no
surprise that, in the absence of the United States, the League ultimately
proved to be congenitally incapable of preserving world peace against the
onslaughts of fascist dictatorships.
During the period between the first and second World Wars, America's
innate isolationist tendencies, dating all the way back to President
George Washington's Farewell Address of 1796, reasserted themselves
and triumphed over America's relatively more recent internationalist for40. ALFRED E. ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
16 (1936).

AND THE RULE OF LAW,
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eign policies promoting multilateral organizational solutions to the
problems of maintaining international peace and security. United States
membership in the World Court and some league to enforce the peace
would occur only after, and as a direct result of, the tragic experience of
World War II. The shocked reaction of the United States government and
people to this second worldwide conflagration produced a profound realization of the dangers of a continued American foreign policy premised
upon the interrelated principles of isolationism in peace and neutrality in
war.
Whether accurate or not, the thesis developed that if, the habitually
obstructionist United States Senate had ratified the Treaty of Versailles,
which contained the League of Nations Covenant, there was a strong possibility that the second World War might never have occurred. Hence, in
order to avoid a suicidal third World War, the United States must not
repeat the same near-fatal mistake it made after the termination of the
first World War by retreating into isolationism in peace and neutrality in
war.' 1 These perceptions convinced the United States government of the
compelling need to sponsor and join the United Nations Organization in
1945.
Thus, under the regime of the United Nations Charter, neither the Organization itself nor any of its members were supposed to remain neutral
in the face of an unjustified threat or use of force,' 2 nor when confronted
by the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression,'4 nor in the event of an actual armed attack or armed aggression by one state against another state." According to article 2(5), all
United Nations members were to give the Organization every assistance
in any action it took in accordance with the Charter and refrain from
giving any assistance to any state against which the Organization took
preventive or enforcement action." Article 2(6) even empowered the Organization to act against nonmembers "so far as may be necessary for the
maintenance of international peace and security.""'
Article 24 determined that the Security Council shall have "primary
responsibility" for the maintenance of international peace and security, 47
and article 25 required all members of the United Nations "to accept and
41. Francis Boyle, American Foreign Policy Toward InternationalLaw and Organization: 1898-1970, 6 Loy. L.A. INT'L Come. L.J. 198-99, 203 (1983).
42. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 4.
43. Id. art. 39.
44. Id. art. 51.
45.

Id. art. 2,

5.

46. Id. art. 2, T 6.
47. Id. art. 24.
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carry out" the decisions of the Security Council.4 8 This injunction included the mandatory adoption of Security Council enforcement measures under articles 41, 42, and 43, though the special agreements needed
to bring this last article into effect were never concluded. Finally, Charter
article 51 also permitted, but did not obligate, United Nations members
to come to the assistance of any state that was the victim of an armed
attack or armed aggression by another state pursuant to what was therein
denominated the international legal right of "collective self-defense.''
Clearly, the continued existence of the institution and laws of neutrality did not fall within the contemplation of the drafters of the United
Nations Charter. Nevertheless, reports of the death of the international
laws of neutrality proved to be greatly overexaggerated. At the time of
the founding of the United Nations Organization, the most that could
have been expected was that the Security Council would somehow preserve and extend the uneasy wartime alliance among the five great powers
into the postwar world upon the basis of its fundamental underlying condition-unanimity. To the degree that the five permanent members of
the Security Council (namely, the United States, United Kingdom,
USSR, France, and China) could maintain, or at least selectively reinstitute, their World War II coalition to handle postwar international crises,
the United Nations Security Council would provide a mechanism to enforce the peace of the world in a manner basically accepted as legitimate
by the remainder of the international community.
The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki occurred, however,
shortly after the United Nations Charter was signed in San Francisco on
June 26, 1945 and even before the Organization itself came into existence
on October 24, 1945. The ensuing Cold War between the United States
and the Soviet Union, each supported by its respective allies, led to a
breakdown of their World War II coalition and thus to a stalemate at the
United Nations Security Council because of the veto power over substantive matters accorded to its five permanent members by Charter article
2 7(3 ).0 Hence, if the Security Council should fail to act in the event of a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and the
state members of the United Nations choose not to exercise their right of
collective self-defense to come to the assistance of the victim of an armed
attack or armed aggression as permitted by article 51, presumably the
customary international laws of neutrality would come into effect to govern the relations between the neutral states on the one hand, and each set
of belligerents on the other. Thus, even under the reign of the intrinsi48.
49.
50.

Id. art. 25.
Id. art. 51.
Id. art. 27,
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cally nonneutral United Nations Charter, in default of the Security Council taking measures "necessary to maintain international peace and security," the customary international laws of neutrality still have an
important role to play in the preservation of international peace and security by constricting the radius and intensity of an ongoing war.' 1
II.

UNITED STATES "NEUTRALITY"

TOWARD THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

In the modern world of international relations, the only legitimate justifications and procedures for the perpetration of violence and coercion by
one state against another are those set forth in the United Nations Charter. The Charter alone contains those rules which have been consented to
by the virtual unanimity of the international community that has voluntarily joined the United Nations Organization. These include and are limited to the article 51 right of individual and collective self-defense in the
event of an "armed attack,"'" chapter 7 "enforcement action" by the
United Nations Security Council,"5 chapter 8 "enforcement action" by the
appropriate regional organizations acting with the authorization of the
Security Council as required by article 53," and the so-called peacekeeping operations organized under the jurisdiction of the Security Council
pursuant to chapter 6"1 or under the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly in accordance with the Uniting for Peace Resolution's or
by the relevant regional organizations acting in conformity with their
proper constitutional procedures and subject to the overall supervision of
the United Nations Security Council as specified in chapter 857 and articles 24"8 and 25.69 All other threats or uses of force are presumptively
illegal and are supposed to be opposed in one fashion or another by the
members of the Organization acting individually or collectively or both.
In light of the aforementioned historical background, it is now possible
to critically analyze and evaluate the United States policy of so-called
neutrality toward the Iran-Iraq War from an international law perspective. There were several indications from the public record that the
Carter Administration tacitly condoned, if not actively encouraged, the
Iraqi invasion of Iran in September of 1980 because of the administration's shortsighted belief that the pressures of belligerency might expe51.

Id. art. 51.
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dite release of the United States diplomatic hostages held by Teheran
since November of 1979. 60 Presumably the Iraqi army could render Iranian oil fields inoperable and, unlike American Marines, do so without
provoking the Soviet Union to exercise its alleged right of counter-intervention under articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Russo-Persian Treaty of
Friendship," Iran unilaterally abrogated these articles on November 5,
1979,6' the day after the American diplomats were seized in Teheran.
The report by columnist Jack Anderson that the Carter Administration
was seriously considering an invasion of Iran to seize its oil fields in the
Fall of 1980 as a last minute attempt to bolster his prospects for re-election was credible.03 It coincided with a substantial increase of United
States military forces stationed in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf. In
the aftermath of the Anderson expos6, the Soviet government raised the
specter of their counter-intervention in order to ward off any contemplated American invasion of Iran.
In any event, American efforts to punish, isolate, and weaken the
Khomeini regime because of the hostage crisis simply prepared the way
for Iraq to invade Iran in September 1980.4 The American policy of neutrality toward the Iran-Iraq War, first adopted by the Carter Administration and supposedly continued by its successor, misrepresented fact if not
the law. A substantial body of diplomatic opinion believed that the American government consistently tilted in favor of Iraq throughout the war
despite its public proclamation of neutrality.60
For example, from the very outset of the conflict, United States Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft ("AWACS") that had been stationed
in Saudi Arabia for the alleged purpose of legitimate self-defense of that
60. Whose Interest?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 27, 1980, at 42; Abdul Kasim Mansur, The Military in the PersianGulf: Who Will Guard the Gulf States from Their Guardians?, ARMED
FORCES J. INT'L, Nov. 1980, at 44; Dangerous Game, 231 THE NATION 395 (1980); Who Will
Police These Shores?, THE MIDDLE EAST, Oct. 1980, at 26; Kavid K. Shipler, Israeli Says
U.S. Is Secretly Supplying Arms to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1981, at A10.
61. Treaty of Friendship, Feb. 26, 1921, R.S.F.S.R.-Persia, arts. 5 and 6, 9 L.N.T.S. 401,
403.
62. W. Michael Reisman, Termination of the U.S.S.R.'s Treaty Right of Interventionin
Iran, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 144 (1980); Huschfeld, Moscow and Khomeini Soviet-IranianRelations in Historical Perspective, ORRIS 219 (1980).
63. CHAMPAIGN-URBANA NEWS GAzETTE, Aug. 18, 1980, at A4; Id., Aug. 19, 1980, at A4;
Id., Aug. 21, 1980, at A4; Id., Aug. 22, 1980, at A4; WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1980, at D13;
WASH. STAR, Sept. 21, 1980, at 6; Jack Anderson, Why I Tell Secrets, WASH. POST, Nov. 30,
1980, § Parade, at 25; WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1981, at B17; Id., June 28, 1983, at C15.
64. Claudia Wright, Implications of the Iraq-IranWar, 59 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 275 (198081); Adeed I. Dawisha, Iraq: The West's Opportunity, 41 FOREIGN POL'Y 134 (Winter 198081).
65. See, e.g. WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1981, § 6, at 31; N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1982, at 1; see
also MIDDLE E., Aug. 24, 1980, at 24; N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1983, at 3.
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country proceeded to supply Iraq with intelligence information collected
on Iranian military movements 6 Clearly, this activity constituted a nonneutral, hostile act directed against Iran that, under pre-United Nations
Charter international law, would have been tantamount to an act of war
in accordance with the traditional and formal definition of that term.
Under the regime of the United Nations Charter, such provision of outright military assistance by the United States government to Iraq against
Iran rendered America an accomplice to the former's/egregiously lawless
aggression upon the latter.
This illegal United States policy toward Iran progressively worsened after the simultaneous termination of the hostage crisis and the installation
of the Reagan Administration in January of 1981. At the outset of the
Reagan Administration, Secretary of State Alexander Haig and his mentor, Henry Kissinger, devoted a good deal of time to publicly lamenting
the dire need for a geopolitical approach to American foreign policy decisionmaking, one premised on a grand theory or strategic design of international relations. Their conceptual framework toward international relations consisted essentially of nothing more sophisticated than a somewhat
refined and superficially rationalized theory of Machiavellian power politics. Consequently, Haig quite myopically viewed the myriad of problems
in the Persian Gulf, Middle East, and Southwest Asia primarily within
the context of a supposed struggle for control over the entire world between the United States and the Soviet Union. Haig erroneously concluded that this global confrontation required the United States to forge
a strategic consensus with Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf
Sheikhdoms, and Pakistan in order to resist anticipated Soviet aggression
in the region.
Haig's vision of founding a United States centered strategic consensus
in Southwest Asia was simply a reincarnated version of Kissinger's
"Nixon Doctrine" whereby regional surrogates were intended to assist the
United States in its efforts to police its spheres of influence throughout
the world by virtue of massive American military assistance. According to
the Reagan Administration's scenario, Israel would become America's new
policeman for stability in the Middle East, filling the position recently
vacated by the deposed Shah of Iran whom the Nixon/Kissinger Administration had unsuccessfully deputized to serve as America's policeman for
the region. Hence, according to Haig's strategic consensus rationale, the
United States had to more fully support the Israeli government of former
Prime Minister Menachem Begin, even during the pursuit of its blatantly
illegal policies in Lebanon and in the territories occupied as a result of
66. Jim McGuish & Antony Terry, How U.S. Sky Spies Help Iraq's War, SUNDAY TIMES,
March 7, 1985, § 1, at 21.
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the 1967 and 1973 wars, primarily because of Israel's overwhelming military superiority (courtesy of the United States) over any Arab state or
combination thereof except Egypt, which had been effectively neutralized'
by its 1979 peace treaty with Israel.
Whereas the Shah fell over internal domestic conditions that were only
exacerbated by the large-scale United States military presence in Iran,
Haig's scheme was tragically flawed from the very moment of its conception. Haig totally disregarded the fundamental realities of Middle Eastern international politics in which traditionally all regional actors have
been far more exclusively concerned about relationships with their surrounding neighbors than about some evanescent threat of Soviet aggression. The more immediate danger to stability in the Middle East and Persian Gulf was not the distant prospect of Soviet intervention but rather a
continuation of the ongoing Iran-Iraq War and the interminable ArabIsraeli dispute. Nevertheless, the Begin government shrewdly manipulated Haig's Machiavellian delusions in order to generate American support for Israel's plan to invade Lebanon in the summer of 1982 for the
express purpose of destroying the PLO and, as a result of the process,
further consolidating its military occupation of the West Bank. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon was intended to serve as a prelude to the gradual de facto annexation of the West Bank in explicit violation of the most
basic principles of international law.
With particular respect to the Persian Gulf, the Reagan Administration's persistent characterization of the Iranian hostage-taking as an act
of international terrorism impeded the formulation of a rational United
States foreign policy toward Iran that could protect America's legitimate
national security interests in a manner fully consistent with the requirements of international law. The Reagan Administration readily succumbed to the seductive temptation of exploiting the American public's
paranoid fear over the spread of Islamic fundamentalism from
Khomeini's Iran throughout the Persian Gulf oil fields to justify covert
assistance and overt alignment by the United States and its European
allies and Middle Eastern friends with the Iraqi aggressor. Apparently,
this perception blindly led the Reagan Administration to foment a comprehensive campaign to destabilize the Khomeini government by means
of C.I.A. sponsorship for paramilitary raids launched from Egypt, Turkey,
and Iraq into Iran by various Iranian opposition groups and for an internal military countercoup, among other nefarious projects.",
These developments represented a serious retrograde step for American
national security interests in the Persian Gulf and the overall integrity of
67. David Alpern Er AL., America's Secret Warrior's, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 10, 1983, at 38-45;
Jay Peterzell, Can Congress Really Check the C.I.A.?, WASH. POST, April 24, 1983, at 61.
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the international legal order. Undaunted, the Reagan Administration was
not content with the mere sponsorship of such covert measures that were
specifically designed to topple the Khomeini Government in Teheran.
More ominously, it proceeded to forge an overt diplomatic and military
alignment with Iraq against Iran throughout the subsequent course of the
Gulf War. Presumably, this was because the Reagan Administration intended Iraq to play a key role in the implementation of its strategic consensus approach toward the region by preventing revolutionary Iran from
subverting its conservative, wealthy, pro-Western, and strategically important neighbors. Hence, the Reagan Administration accelerated the policy of its predecessor to encourage the re-establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the United States and Iraq, relations that had
been severed by the latter in reaction to the 1967 Arab-Israel War. Somewhat paradoxically, seventeen years later the pressures of another Middle
Eastern war would propel Iraq into reinstituting normal diplomatic relations with the United States in November of 1984.8
As part of this progressive development in their anti-Iranian rapprochement, the Reagan Administration, in March of 1982, removed Iraq
from the official list of states that allegedly provided support to so-called
acts of international terrorism despite the existence of little evidence that
Iraq had fundamentally altered its policies in this regard.6 ' Such delisting
rendered Iraq eligible to purchase "dual-use" equipment and technology
in the United States, equipment that could readily be employed for either
civilian or military purposes and would probably be used for the latter.70
This administrative act prepared the way for the Reagan Administration
to issue a license permitting the export of six Lockheed L-100 civilian
transport aircraft to Iraq.7 1 Although the sale of the aircraft was licensed
to Iraqi Airways, the L-100 is the civilian version of the Lockheed C-130
Hercules military transport and troop carrier.7 2 In a similar vein, four
months later the Commerce Department licensed the sale of six small jets
to Iraq, four of which admittedly possessed military applications."5
Nevertheless, despite the Reagan Administration's best efforts, the provision of political, military, and economic assistance by the United States,
its North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") allies, and Middle
68. Mansour Farhang, The Iran-Iraq War: The Feud, the Tragedy, the Spoils, 2 WORLD
POL'Y J. 671 (1985).
69. Under the provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979, the Secretary of
Commerce in consultation with the Secretary of State can review and adjust the list of restricted countries. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(1) (1988).
70. David Ignatius, Iraq is Turning to U.S., Britain For Armaments, WALL ST. J, Mar.
5, 1982, at 22.
71. Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) U.S. Export Weekly 312, June 1, 1982.
72. A Tilt Towards Baghdad?, MIDDLs E. 7, June 1982; NY. TIMES, July 18, 1983, at 3.
73. U.S. Licenses Sale to Iraq of Small Jet, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1982, at 12.

1992]

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

Eastern friends to Iraq proved insufficient to stem the tide of Iranian military advances. Hence, near the start of 1984, the United States government publicly announced that it had informed various friendly nations in
the Persian Gulf that Iran's defeat of Iraq would be "contrary to United
States interests" and that steps would be taken to prevent this result."'
Accordingly, in April of 1984 sources revealed that President Reagan had
signed two National Security Decision Directives to set the stage for the
United States government to take a more confrontational stance against
Iran.7 One of the options under consideration was the United States provision of so-called dual-use equipment such as helicopters to Iraq.7 6 In
addition, the Reagan Administration made it known that it would look
"more favorably" upon the sale of weapons to Iraq by friends and allies of
the United States government." The very next month, the Reagan administration publicly revealed that it was prepared to intervene militarily
in the Iran-Iraq War to prevent an Iranian
victory that would install a
7
radical Shi'ite government in Baghdad. 8
Pursuant to this set of decisions, in February of 1985, Textron's Bell
helicopter division agreed to sell forty-five large helicopters to Iraq, and
Iraqi defense officials were involved in negotiating this transaction. 79 Six
months later, sources reported that the forty-five American made helicopters sold to Iraq were initially developed as Iranian troop carriers.' 0 One
United States official monitoring the transaction said the helicopter
model involved was "clearly a dual-use item" with "a potential for military use.""
With such incidents having been brought to light, one can conclude
that since the Reagan Administration's ascent to power in 1981, the
United States government abandoned all pretense of alleged American
neutrality toward the Iran-Iraq War in order to come down decisively on
the side of Iraqi aggression against Iran. Under the traditional international laws of neutrality, these activities clearly constituted hostile acts
74. Don Oberdorfer, U.S. Moves to Avert Iraqi Loss, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1984, at 1;
David Ignatius, U.S. Tilts Towards Iraq to Thwart Iran, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1984, at 20.
75. Middle East Policy Survey, no. 102 (20 April 1984):.
76. Jack Anderson, Reagan Urged to Take Sides in Persian Gulf, WASH. POST, Dec. 1,
1983, at 17; Philip Marfleet, Calling the Iranian Bluff, MIDDLE E., July 1984, at 16-17.
77. Amos Perlmutter, SquanderingOpportunity in the Gulf, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1983,
at 32.

78.

Roy Gutman, U.S. Willing to Use Air Power to Keep Iran From Beating Iraq, LONG

ISLAND NEWSDAY, May 20, 1984, at 3; Ignatius, U.S. Tilts Toward Iraq.

79. David Seib, Textron's Bell Unit and Iraq Seen Near Final Agreements on Sale of
45 Helicopters, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1985, at 32.
80. David Ottaway, U.S. Copter Sales to Iraq Raises Neutrality Issue, WASH. POST,
Sept. 13, 1985, at 1.
81. Id.
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that Iran could have opposed with a formal declaration of war against the
United States."5 Of course, at the time prudence dictated that Iran avoid
being provoked by the United States and Iraq into making a formal declaration of war against the United States.
Acute danger arose from Iraq's calculated policy of escalating the severity of attacks against Iranian oil installations and supplies for the express
purpose of precipitating direct United States military intervention to
keep the Straits of Hormuz free from retaliatory interference by Iran.
Baghdad officials hoped that such outright United States military involvement in the Gulf War would ultimately rescue Iraq from defeat at
the hands of Iran.8" The boarding of a United States merchant ship by
Iranian sailors near the Straits of Hormuz" indicated how the Reagan
Administration reversed its policy of alleged "neutrality" toward the Gulf
war.
III.

RESTORING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY TO THE PERSIAN

GULF

Even if the United States had been factually and legally neutral in the
Iran-Iraq War, such a position would itself be shocking and indefensible
under the most rudimentary principles of international law. When in the
post-United Nations Charter world has the United States been neutral in
the face of outright aggression? As the United States government should
have learned from the tragic history of American neutrality toward widespread acts of aggression committed by fascist dictatorships during the
1930s, peace is indeed indivisible. In a thermonuclear age, aggression per
se is the most dangerous threat to world peace. The United States could
not be consistent, believable, or effective in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan without likewise condemning the Iraqi invasion of
Iran. America's rank hypocrisy in this matter fooled no one but itself.
The United States, its NATO allies, and Japan all possessed vital national security interests in preventing'the disintegration of Iran due to
factional strife, regionally based autonomous breakaway movements, or
external aggression or subversion originating, from Iraq or the Soviet
Union. The continued destabilization of Iran only generated further opportunities for Soviet penetration and exploitation. The United States
should not have permitted the development of a permanent threat to
Saudi Arabia and the free flow of Gulf oil through the Straits of Hormuz
FRANCIS A. BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (1985).
83. John H. McNeill, Neutral Rights and Maritime Sanctions: The Effect of Two Gulf
82.
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by encouraging conditions that might lead to the installation of an Iranian regime acting at the behest of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it is
crucial to reiterate that the Iranian people possessed the exclusive right
to determine their own form of government without overt or covert
United States intervention, even if this means the continuation of an Islamic fundamentalist regime in Teheran.
To forestall any potential for a Soviet invasion of Iran under the pretext of the 1921 Russo-Persian Treaty,ss the most prudent course for the
Reagan Administration to have taken would have been to work toward
the establishment of a strong, stable, and secure government in Teheran
that was able to undertake the military measures necessary to offset Russian divisions massed on Iran's borders with the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. With the hostages crisis far behind, the Reagan Administration should have moved to restore normal diplomatic relations with Iran
as soon as possible and without any prior conditions. Most importantly,
the Reagan Administration should have completely reversed and publicly
repudiated the Carter Administration's policy of alleged neutrality toward the Iran-Iraq War.
The American government must officially label Iraq as the aggressor in
the Iran-Iraq War. Furthermore, the American government should have
publicly called for an immediate cease-fire. The Reagan Administration
should have attempted to convince its NATO allies, Egypt, Jordan, and
the Sudan, to terminate their provision of military weapons, equipment,
supplies, and soldiers to Iraq. Operating in conjunction with its allies and
Iran, the United States could have worked with the United Nations Security Council for the- formal adoption of this program and its implementation by the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force along
the Iraq-Iran border designated to replace withdrawing Iraqi and Iranian
troops on a transitional basis.
The dispute between Iraq and Iran over the Shatt al-Arab estuary
should be submitted to the procedures for compulsory arbitration set
forth in article 6 of the 1975 Iran-Iraq Treaty on International Borders
and Good Neighborly Relations." Although insufficient to justify a
counter-invasion of Iraq, Iranian demands for the payment of reparations
and for the deposition of President Saddam Hussein because of Iraq's
war of aggression are quite reasonable and fully supportable under fundamental principles of international law. The United States government
should recognize these Iranian concerns as valid and should accommodate
them to some extent within the framework ultimately adopted by the
85.
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86. Treaty on International Borders and Good Neighborly Relations, June 13, 1975,
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United Nations Security Council for, the peaceful settlement of this
dispute.
Of course the improvement and normalization of American diplomatic
relations with Iraq was a desirable objective as well. But that objective
should not have been pursued in derogation of the fundamental principle
of international law requiring the condemnation of aggression and by
abandoning Iran to its own fate or to the account of the Soviet Union.
Indeed, if the Reagan Administration truly believed that the major
United States strategic objective in the Persian Gulf was to counteract a
threatened Soviet thrust through Iran toward Saudi Arabia, the best
American defense could have been mounted, not from the borders of Iraq,
but from the eastern and northern frontiers of Iran, at the request of the
Iranian government and with the assistance of the Iranian army. Within
this context a creditable American Rapid Deployment Force ("RDF")
could have played an effective role within the requirements of international law. Such action would be in furtherance of the right of collective
87
self-defense recognized by article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
As for the Iranian threat to close the Straits of Hormuz in the event
Iraq were to escalate attacks against Iranian oil installations, world public
opinion should hold the United States government's illegal pro-Iraqi policies fully accountable for any political, military, and economic catastrophes that might result therefrom. During the conflicts, the Iranian government had the perfect right under international law to board and
search merchant ships transiting the Straits of Hormuz for the purpose of
confiscating any contraband of war en route to Iraq. 8 Meanwhile, to the
extent that Persian Gulf oil can be transported via pipelines terminating
on the Red Sea, the strategic importance of controlling the Straits of Hormuz will diminish.
The criticism that such a dramatic reversal of American policy in the
Gulf would alienate friendly regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
Jordan, inter alia, overlooks the fact that American neutrality in the IranIraq war simply encouraged Arab countries to temporarily put aside their
deep-seated animosities for the purpose of aligning themselves with an
aggressive Iraq against non-Arab Iran. Furthermore, the direct contribution of massive war loans to Iraq by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf
Sheikhdoms fatally compromised their alleged neutrality toward the IranIraq War." Under the pre-United Nations Charter customary international law of neutrality, Iran was entitled to treat the provision of such
military and economic assistance by these countries to Iraq as an act of
87. UN. CHARTER art. 51.
88. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 740 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952).
89. Philip Marfleet, Economic Warfare in the Gulf, MIDDLE E., Sept. 1983, at 79.
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hostility directed against it, thus warranting a declaration of war.90 Iran
wisely refrained from so acting. Nevertheless, the United States government did not discourage, and indeed in many instances encouraged and
assisted, such nonneutral practices by numerous Middle Eastern countries against Iran." This misguided American policy should have been reversed immediately. Consequently, because this policy was not reversed,
it thoroughly and irrevocably destabilized international peace and security in the Persian Gulf and Middle East.
Restoring peace to the Persian Gulf demanded vigorous American leadership acting in strict accordance with the rules of international law and
in full cooperation with the relevant international institutions. Unfortunately, despite its continued protestations of neutrality toward the Gulf
war, the Reagan Administration still tilted quite strenuously in favor of
Iraq against Iran. Continued and demonstrable United States partiality
for Iraq only prolonged this tragic conflict by discouraging Iran from
working with the United Nations Security Council to end the war because
one of the latter's permanent and most important members was evisceraly and implacably prejudiced against it. For this very reason, those inexcusably few United Nations Security Council resolutions that have so far
been adopted on the Gulf War were all clearly and admittedly biased in
favor of Iraq.2
From a long-term perspective on Persian Gulf security, the Reagan Administration should have abandoned Haig's Machiavellian objective of
creating a formal anti-Soviet strategic consensus in the region under
American leadership, s and substitute for it a policy that promoted the
foundation of an effective regional, collective self-defense and policing arrangement. Therefore, the Reagan Administration should have encouraged the efforts of six regional states, namely, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Qatar, to form a viable Gulf
Cooperation Council. Such an organization could have metamorphosized
into an effective Gulf Security Organization, affiliated with the United
Nations Organization under chapter 8 of the Charter, and possessing a
standing peacekeeping force or the ability to field one on short notice.9 '
Though the Council aims to keep both superpowers out of the region, a
90. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 154-62 (Holt, Rienhard & Winston,
Inc., 2d ed. 1967).
91. Pat Towell, New Gulf Incident Rekindles an Old Debate, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY 1056 (April 23, 1988).
92. See, e.g., 35 U.N. SCOR, 2248th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/479 (1980); 36 U.N.
SCOR, 2288th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (1981); 37 U.N. SCOR, 2388d mtg. at 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/514 (1982).
93. BOYLE, supra note 82, at 228.
94. Id.
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Gulf Security Organization could only advance the interests of the United
States, its NATO allies, and Japan by the establishment of some degree
of peace, order, and stability in this volatile area."
Geography gives the Soviet Union advantages the West cannot match
without supporting the creation of such an effective regional collective
self-defense and policing system. A Gulf security organization would be
far more successful at the pacific settlement of local disputes, opposing
intra-regional aggression, and the suppression of externally fomented disturbances than the American RDF (now renamed the United States Central Command) ever could."0 The United States should not become a
member of or play any formal role within such a Gulf security organization so as not to undermine the organization's claim to regional legitimacy
and to formal nonalignment vis-A-vis the two superpowers. But America
should have made clear its intention to provide military assistance to
such an organization in the event of an armed attack upon one of the
organization's members by an extra-regional power such as the Soviet
Union. Such assistance would have been in furtherance of the right of
collective 7 self-defense recognized by article 51 of the United Nations
Charter.

In regard to United States measures designed to promote individual
self-defense by the states of this region, the purveyance of sophisticated
American weapons systems and technology to Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Pakistan, is a most disturbing factor. As events in Iran have
demonstrated, arms sales can easily become counterproductive. Any
United States arms transfer policy must be required by the legitimate
defensive needs of these countries as defined by international law and
interpreted in good faith by the American government. Unilateral policy
determinations by these foreign governments do not provide adequate
criteria. Thus, the Reagan Administration should not have provided
weapons to Saudi Arabia simply to curry favor and thus secure a stable
flow of expensive oil to the West; or to China in the expectation of utilizing that country as a geopolitical card to be played in some Machiavellian
balancing game of power politics with the Soviet Union over Afghanistan;
or to Jordan for the purpose of creating a surrogate force for illegal military intervention throughout the Persian Gulf.
Nor must such weapons be given to any state in this or other regions of
the world that manifests a tendency to employ them in a manner either
the United States government or the United Nations Security Council
deems violative of international law. Hence, the Israeli air strikes with
95.
96.
John
97.
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American-made planes against the Iraqi nuclear reactor" and the PLO
headquarters in Beirut combined with Israel's threat to bomb Syrian
antiaircraft missiles in Lebanon during the summer of 1981,100 followed
by its patently illegal invasion of that country one year later, ' " should
have been grounds for additional concern and re-evaluation by the Reagan Administration. The same can be said for Pakistan's three wars with
India'02 and its frantic pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. 10
All of these states bore heavy burdens of proof in regard to pending
American arms transfers that were not discharged in a manner satisfactory to the requirements of both international law and United States domestic law.10 4 Unfortunately, the Reagan Administration apparently
chose to rely upon the wholesale provision of American military equipment to various governments in this region and around the globe as an
ineffectual and ultimately self-defeating substitute for the hard task of
formulating a set of coherent principles for the conduct of American foreign policy on some basis other than Haig's Machiavellian predilections.
Most regretfully, his successor, George Shultz, proceeded to heedlessly
and quite enthusiastically embrace Haig's strategic consensus approach to
this region of the world.
Finally, as events in the Middle East have demonstrated, the success of
any American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf cannot be divorced from
the compelling need to achieve an overall peace settlement between Israel
and its Arab neighbors. An absolute precondition to the security of the
Persian Gulf oil lifeline to Europe and Japan is active American support
for progress toward implementing the international legal right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in accordance with the rules of international law and in full cooperation with the relevant international institutions. Otherwise, the primary political objective of Gulf states will
continue to be to organize their efforts and substantial resources in opposition to both Israel and the United States. In the meantime, the Reagan
Administration's decision to assign troops from the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, already designated as parts of the RDF, to serve as component units within the multinational peacekeeping force that is policing
the easternmost section of the Sinai desert '05 in the aftermath of Israel's
withdrawal on April 25, 1982, was egregiously shortsighted. The monu98. + Id. at 228.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 2314(d), 2753(c), 2754 (1976).
105. BOYLE, supra note 82, at 229.
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mental peace between Egypt and Israel should not have been linked in
any way to the prospect of illegal American military intervention in the
Persian Gulf.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If a third World War should occur, it will probably result from a direct
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over the
Middle East/Persian Gulf region' Southwest Asia could readily become
the Balkans of the 1980s. For example, the promulgation of the so called
Carter Doctrine, in which President Carter committed the United States
government to use military force to prevent "any outside force to gain
control of the Persian Gulf region,"10 constituted a dangerous bluff
whose potential for nuclear confrontation and escalation was immeasurable. A Pentagon report had already concluded that even with a creditable
RDF the United States alone could not successfully defend Iranian oil
fields from a Soviet conventional invasion unless, perhaps, America resorts to the first-use of tactical nuclear weapons.'0 " But deployment in a
conventional conflict with the Soviet Union would probably degenerate
into strategic nuclear warfare between the two superpowers and their
allies.
Likewise, as publicly admitted, the RDF would not have succeeded at
its two other appointed tasks of seizing and operating Persian Gulf oil
fields against the wishes of the local governments in the event of another
cutoff along the lines of 1973 or of protecting petroleum facilities from
destruction by opposition movements indigenous to the region or by externally supported saboteurs.0 " Such disruptions are beyond the substantial capacity of the RDF to counteract. Consequently, since the Carter
Doctrine can neither deter a Soviet invasion nor stem the tide of revolutionary change in the Gulf, the Reagan Administration should have abandoned it.
Nevertheless, somewhat paradoxically, the Reagan Administration eagerly embraced this ill-conceived, rhetorical flourish by a former opponent, hastily uttered during the heat of an unsuccessful election campaign,' " as the cornerstone of its foreign policy toward the Persian Gulf.
Worse yet, the Reagan Corollary improvidently extended the Carter Doc106.
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109.

BOYLE, supra note 82, at 216.

19921

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

trine to ordain United States opposition to internally based interference
with the free flow of Saudi Arabian oil. The United States government
should not have been tempted to enter into de facto alliances with feudal
or reactionary regimes in order to guarantee their continued survival
against internal'adversaries in return for stable supplies of expensive oil,
especially at the calculated risk of precipitating a theoretically "limited"
tactical nuclear war with the Soviet Union. As demonstrated by the Iranian revolution, even a perceptibly radical successor regime will recognize
the need to sell oil to Western Europe, Japan, and the United States for
the hard currency necessary to finance imports essential to fulfilling the
basic human needs of its citizenry, such as United States food supplies,
let alone-to pay for an economic development program.
Because of the RDF's demonstrative susceptibility to abuse and to its
impermissible use under international law, the United States Congress
should have amended the War Powers Act of 197310 to provide that the
President of the United States cannot order the introduction of RDF
troops into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances without prior authorization by a joint resolution of Congress. A narrowly drawn exception to
this amendment would have permitted the President to use RDF troops
solely for the purpose of rescuing a substantial number of American citizens from situations where they face imminent danger of death without
the need for prior Congressional authorization, though subject to the
other requirements of the Act. Without such an amendment, any United
States President will be constantly tempted to order the RDF into combat for all sorts of reasons and under a variety of pretexts simply because
a seemingly effective United States interventionary force might be in existence and would be subject to his unfettered discretion. Otherwise, direct United States military intervention in the Persian Gulf/Middle East
could readily serve as the harbinger for nuclear Armageddon.
Postscript
The author finished the research and writing for this Article as of February 1, 1986, when it was submitted in advance to the organizers of the
University of New Orleans Symposium on Neutrality for distribution and
delivery at the conference two weeks later. Hence, the Article did not
take into account the numerous facts surrounding the Reagan Administration's foreign policy toward the Iran-Iraq War that have emerged into
the public record since the outbreak of the Iran-contra scandal in October
110. War Powers Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555-559 (1973) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988)).
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of 1986. The author believes that intellectual honesty requires him to deal
with these subsequently revealed facts in a Postscript,rather than by revising an already delivered and publicly disseminated scholarly paper.
This way, the readers are free to assess for themselves the merit and integrity of the author's analysis as of early 1986.
Therefore, except for minor editorial corrections, the above section of
this chapter contains the exact text of the paper which the author submitted to and delivered before the Symposium. Nevertheless, for the sake
of completeness, this postscript offers a necessarily brief and highly impressionistic overview of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy toward the Iran-Iraq war in light of the Iran-contra expos6 and subsequent
developments. A more detailed treatment of this subject will be found in
a forthcoming book entitled The Persian Gulf War and International
Law."' Facts that have emerged into the public record as of January 20,
1988 form the basis for the following analysis.
At the 1986 Neutrality Symposium, the author stated that as events in
Iran have demonstrated, arms sales can easily become counterproductive.
Any United States arms transfer policy must be required by the legitimate defensive 'needs of these [Middle Eastern] countries as defined by
international law and interpreted in good faith by the American government. These words were not written in reference to or with knowledge of
the Iran-contra scandal, but they nevertheless seem to have constituted
the major lesson to be learned from it. For reasons better explained in
chapter 8 of World Politics and International Law, 2 the author saw
nothing wrong with the Reagan Administration's attempt to negotiate
and compromise for the release of American hostages who were being
held in Lebanon by an Islamic fundamentalist group which was acting in
sympathy with Iran over United States support for Iraqi aggression
throughout the Gulf war. However, arms transfers by the Reagan Administration should not have employed the currency to purchase liberty for
the hostages.
An Islamic fundamentalist group seized the hostages in order to obtain
the release of its comrades imprisoned in Kuwait-some of whom were
and still are subject to execution-for bombing attacks perpetrated
against Kuwaiti, French, and American political targets in Kuwait in opposition to their joint support for Iraq against Iran. A negotiated exchange of American hostages in Lebanon for the release of Lebanese prisoners in Kuwait would have been a proper policy for the Reagan
Administration to pursue with the Iranian government, inter alia. Indeed,
111. FRANCIS A. BOYLE, THE PERSIAN
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the Reagan Administration could have implemented such a policy if it
genuinely wished to obtain the release of the American hostages in
Lebanon.
The Reagan Administration's provision of sophisticated weapons to
some of the most radical elements in Iran was never part of a self-styled
strategic opening to that country, but simply constituted a straight out
arms-for-hostages swap that basic norms of international law and United
States domestic law could not justify. Iran did not require these weapons
for the legitimate defense of its country, which was no longer in jeopardy.
Rather, Iran used the arms to continue the prosecution of its war against
Iraq despite repeated calls by the international community for a peaceful
settlement. According to articles 2(3) and 33 of the United Nations Charter, Iran was under an obligation to pursue a peaceful termination of its
war with Iraq" 3 despite the undeniable fact that Iran was the original
victim of Iraqi aggression. The sale of sophisticated weapons by the
United States government to Iran at this penultimate stage in the IranIraq War only exacerbated and compounded the already daunting political complexities of the situation.
In any event, the exposure of the United States arms transfers to Iran
revealed to the entire international community that the basis of the Reagan Administration's alleged neutrality policy toward the Iran-Iraq War
had been thoroughly unprincipled, duplicitous, and hypocritical from the
outset. The same can be said for the Reagan Administration's congenitally defective war against international terrorism that was the intended
keystone of its bankrupt foreign policy toward the Middle East since
1981. Such unscrupulous policies violated the basic principles of international law as set forth in my 1986 paper, as well as several well-established prohibitions of United States constitutional, civil, and criminal law
that are too numerous to list here but which the Independent Counsel/
Special Prosecutor Lawrence Walsh will invoke when he indicts the principals in the Iran-Contra scandal. As argued in the last chapter of World
Politics and InternationalLaw, the United States government's practice
of Machiavellianism abroad will ineluctably subvert, if not destroy, con1
stitutionalism and the rule of law at home.' '
In the aftermath of the Iran-Contra revelations, starting in October of
1986, the Reagan Administration sought to undo the self-inflicted damage
to its credibility with the American people and with Arab states in the
Middle East by adopting an even more intransigent and overtly hostile
stance against Iran. The Reagan Administration abandoned even the pretense of feigned neutrality toward the Iran-Iraq War and actively and
113.
114.
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directly intervened on the side of Iraq against Iran by means of United
States military forces. This decision produced the so-called reflagging of
Kuwaiti oil tankers under the American flag in order to provide a thin
veneer of legal respectability to justify to the American people and Congress the introduction of United States military forces directly into the
war in overall support of Iraq's strategic objectives.
However, after the destruction of the Stark by an Iraqi (not Iranian)
jet fighter, the American people and Congress should have made it clear
to the Reagan Administration that they would not tolerate the placing of
United States sailors and, airmen in harm's way to support the bloodthirsty dictatorship of Saddam Hussein for any reason. Nevertheless, after expressing some lukewarm reservations, Congress caved in to the Reagan Administration by refusing to insist that the Reagan Administration
obey the terms of the War Powers Act when introducing United States
naval and air forces to escort the reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian
Gulf War. How many United States servicemen could have been prevented from dying in the Gulf War? This is precisely the type of outcome
the War Powers Act is designed to prevent-at least without formal Congressional authorization for direct United States military intervention
into a situation of armed combat.
Yet today, several otherwise sensible political leaders and public pundits have argued disingenuously that because the Reagan Administration
successfully refused to obey the War Powers Act in the Persian Gulf, the
Act itself has demonstrated its impracticability and should be repealed or
eviscerated. To the contrary, the Reagan Administration's creeping military intervention into the Iran-Iraq War on the side of Iraq during the
past seven years precisely demonstrates the need for more (not less) restrictive amendment to the Act that the author called for in 1986:
Because of the Rapid Deployment Force's demonstrative susceptibility to
abuse and to its impermissible use under international law, the American
Congress should amend the War Powers Act of 1973 to provide that the
President of the United States cannot order the introduction of RDF
troops into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances without prior authorization by a joint resolution of Congress.'"
The RDF was renamed the United States Central Command, and direct
United States military intervention in the Iran-Iraq War took place under
this rubric.
No international legal significance was given to the Reagan Administration's so-called reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers. First, the reflagged
115. Id. at 217.
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Kuwaiti oil tankers lacked the "genuine link" to the United States that is
required by article 5 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas in
order to establish United States nationality for the tankers. 11 Furthermore, pursuant to the ruling of the International Court of Justice in the
Nottebohm Case1 concerning the meaning of a "genuine link" as involving the contrived alteration of nationality by a person in contemplation of
war, Iran would have had the perfect right to disregard this sham transaction and continue to treat the tankers as possessing Kuwaiti nationality.
Moreover, even if the change of nationality for the tankers was considered effective under international law and opposable by the United States
against Iran, for the Reagan Administration to have undertaken this admittedly partial type of activity in favor of one belligerent during the
course of an ongoing war, fatally compromised its alleged neutrality and
constituted a hostile act against Iran.
Finally, as discussed in my 1986 paper, Iran had a right under international law to exercise its belligerent rights by stopping merchant ships,
searching the ships for contraband, confiscating any contraband discovered or, in certain circumstances, destroying merchant ships that proceeded through the Straits of Hormuz into and out of the Persian Gulf on
their way to and from Kuwait and the other Gulf states that were acting
as de facto allies of Iraq throughout the war. Despite the Reagan Administration's disingenuous protestations to the contrary, Kuwait had never
been neutral in the war against Iran. Rather, Kuwait has consistently
sided with Iraq throughout the course of the war, though against its better judgment. Nevertheless, Kuwait's acts of cobelligerence included providing billions of dollars in loans to Iraq; shipping munitions, equipment,
and supplies through Kuwait to and from Iraq; allocating a fixed percentage of Kuwaiti oil exports to account in order to finance the war; providing reconnaissance information and intelligence to Iraq; giving some degree of military cooperation and logistical support for Iraq, etc.
Recall that it was Kuwait-Iraq's de facto ally-that had originally requested Soviet and American protection for its nonneutral merchant
shipping. Perhaps somewhat foolishly, the Reagan Administration readily
acquiesced to an Iraqi-Kuwaiti plan specifically designed to elicit direct
United States military intervention on the side of Iraq against Iran under
the flimsy pretext of protecting the passage of allegedly neutral ships
through international straits and on the high seas. On the other hand, the
author personally believes that the Reagan Administration probably
orchestrated the Kuwaiti/Iraqi request to the United States and the So116.
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viet Union in the full knowledge and expectation that the White House
could then successfully manipulate the evanescent threat of a picayune
Soviet naval presence in the Gulf for the purpose of convincing a reluctant American people and Congress to acquiesce in an already planned
direct intervention by United States military forces into the war. The
purpose of this plan would be to prevent a feared Iraqi defeat upon Iran's
otherwise anticipated renewal of its annual offensive near Basra in the
winter of 1988.
In any event, it was completely and purposefully misleading for the
Reagan Administration to have publicly characterized Kuwait as a neutral in the Iran-Iraq War. For all of the above reasons, the Kuwaiti tankers were never engaged in neutral shipping that would be entitled to the
benefits of such a designation under the international laws of neutrality.
This holds true irrespective of their so-called reflagging by the United
States government. Therefore, the United States Navy escorted nonneutral shipping in violation of United States obligations as a neutral under
international law, in direct contradiction to Iran's belligerent rights under
the laws of war, and at the risk of precipitating an Iranian declaration of
war or at least acts of hostility directed against the United States in the
Gulf or elsewhere for such belligerent behavior.
In other words, the Reagan Administration proceeded to provide military assistance to Kuwait, which was an ally of Iraq against Iran, and
thus rendered the United States a de facto ally of Iraq against Iran in the
Gulf War. In no sense of the traditional meaning of the term, therefore,
can it even be arguably said that the United States government was any
longer neutral in the Iran-Iraq War. Hence, the Reagan Administration's
claim that it introduced United States naval forces into the Iran-Iraq
War for the twin purposes of (1) permitting neutral shipping to transit
the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, and (2) ensuring the free
flow of Gulf oil through the Straits, becomes legal, factual, and political
nonsense.
For example, the State Department publicly admitted that it was Iraq
which started the so-called tanker war in 1984. The State Department
also generally agreed that Iraq, not Iran, perpetrated the vast majority of
destruction that had been inflicted against any type of shipping in the
Gulf. According to the supposed logic of the Reagan Administration's legal rationale (whose very premises the author completely rejects), if the
purpose of direct United States military intervention was, either in fact
or in law, intended to prevent the destruction of genuinely neutral shipping in the Gulf, then protective United States military activities should
have been directed primarily against Iraq, not Iran. For reasons that will
become clear below, the author does not advocate that course of conduct
either.
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Well before direct United States military intervention into the Persian
Gulf War, the Pentagon publicly stated that Iran was essentially respecting the international laws relating to the exercise of its belligerent rights
regarding the search and seizure of merchant ships and contraband in the
Persian Gulf and Straits of Hormuz. Iran had engaged in destruction of
merchant tankers travelling to or from Iraq/Kuwait primarily in reprisal
for Iraqi attacks against merchant shipping destined to and from Iran.
Under the customary international law doctrine known as reprisal, what
otherwise would be a violation of international law in time of war nevertheless can be excused if it is undertaken for the express purpose of
bringing an original violator of the laws of war (that is, Iraq) into compliance therewith; provided that the reprisal is essentially proportionate to
the original violation and that people and property who are afforded special protections by international law are respected. 11 8 Under the current
circumstances of the Gulf War, the latter restriction could not apply to
protect nonneutral merchant ships in the Gulf, especially when they voluntarily decided to enter exclusion zones proclaimed by either side, frequently carried contraband of war anyway, and were fully aware of the
Iranian reprisal policy.
Moreover, Iran had publicly taken the position that the primary reason
it attacked merchant tankers destined to or from Iraq/Kuwait was to react to and discourage further Iraqi attacks on merchant shipping to or
from Iran. It has consistently been in the national interest of Iran to
maintain the free flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz to continue
financing its war effort. By contrast, with the closure of Iraqi ports on the
Shatt al-Arab estuary and the diversion of its oil exports by pipelines
running through Syria and Turkey to the Mediterranean and through
Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea, it has been in Iraq's interest to close the
Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf to oil tanker shipping from Iran.
Therefore, between Iran and Iraq, it was Iraq that did far more damage
to the free flow of oil from the Gulf. Once again, if the Reagan Administration had really intended to intervene in order to maintain the flow of
oil from the Gulf through the Straits, it should have intervened against
Iraq, not Iran. Just like the neutrality argument, therefore, this oil rationale was totally spurious to begin with and quite cynically manipulated by
the Reagan Administration as another pretext in order to justify overt
and direct United States military intervention in favor of Iraq against
Iran to the American people and Congress. As a direct result of the Iraqi
attack upon Iran in 1980, as well as the institution of the tanker war by
Iraq in 1984, only a miniscule percentage of annual world oil supplies ac118. KELSEN, supra note 90, at 20-22.
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tually transit the Straits of Hormuz by tanker, and a good deal of that is
Iranian oil anyway.
Ironically, but not surprisingly, it was Iran, not Iraq, that demonstrated
the greater degree of respect for the rules of international law concerning
neutrality and belligerency in the Gulf and the Straits. Furthermore, it
was the United States that is engaged in hostile and provocative military
maneuvers and actions against Iran-not vice versa-and was illegally
preventing Iran from exercising its belligerent rights under well-recognized principles of international law. Thus, when United States naval
forces attacked Iranian ships and Iranian oil drilling platforms in the
Gulf, it was not a legitimate act of self-defense as recognized by article 51
of the United Nations Charter.1 1
Indeed, these actions were specifically designated to be measures of retaliation by President Reagan. Yet until the advent of the Reagan Administration, the United States government had never taken the position
that retaliation is a legitimate act of self-defense under article 51 of the
United Nations Charter. To the contrary, even during the darkest days of
the Vietnam War, the United States government had always argued that
retaliation was not self-defense and therefore was prohibited by the terms
of article 51.
The Reagan Administration's interpretation of the right of self-defense
to include retaliation in the Gulf (as well as in Lebanon, Libya, and its
so-called war against international terrorism) represents a truly perverse
innovation in the universally accepted corpus of both customary and conventional international law on self-defense which goes back to the famous
1837 case of the good ship Caroline.12 0 There, United States Secretary of
State Daniel Webster took the official position on behalf of the United
States government that alleged measures of self-defense can only be justified when the "necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming,
and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. 1 21 The
Caroline test for the validity of any act of alleged self-defense was later
adopted and approved by the International Military Tribunal convened
at Nuremberg in 1945 for the purpose of trying the major Nazi war
criminals.1 22
2
More recently came the World Court's seminal Corfu Channel Case, '
that, interestingly enough, involved a state's use of force to remove mines
119. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
120. See The Caroline, in MOORE, supra note 15, at 409, 412.
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from an international strait by entering another state's territorial waters.
In that case a squadron of British warships traversing the North Corfu
Strait struck some mines with resulting loss of lives and ships. Three
weeks later, British minesweepers swept the North Corfu Channel under
the protection of a British armada and entered Albanian territorial waters for the purpose of removing and later examining moored mines. 1 24 All
fifteen members of the International Court of Justice, together with a
judge ad hoc appointed by Albania, were unanimously held that by reason of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian territorial waters in the
course of the minesweeping operation, the United Kingdom had violated
the sovereignty of Albania. 25 In this regard, the World Court emphatically rejected all grounds of alleged defense under customary interna-

tional law that were proffered by the British government:
The Court cannot accept such a line of defence. The Court can only
regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy
of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and
such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organization, find a place in international law. Intervention is perhaps still less
admissible in the particular form it would take here; for, from the nature
of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful States, and might
easily lead to perverting the administration of international justice itself.
The United Kingdom Agent, in his speech in reply, has further classified [the minesweeping operation] among methods of self-protection or
self-help. The Court' cannot accept this defence either. Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation
of international relations. The Court recognizes that the Albanian Government's complete failure to carry out its duties after the explosions,
and the dilatory nature of its diplomatic notes, were extenuating circumstances for the action of the United Kingdom Government. But to ensure
respect for international law, of which it is the organ, the Court must
declare that the action of the British Navy'constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty."'
Even more significantly, the World Court repudiated these vagarious
doctrines without explicitly relying upon the United Nations Charter because Albania was not yet a party while Great Britain was. 27 Hence, one
can construe the Court's holding on this point to constitute an authoritative declaration of the requirements of customary international law, binding upon all members of the international community irrespective of the
Charter, on the use of force. A fortiori, therefore, when both parties to an
124.
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international conflict are United Nation members, such as the United
States and Iran, articles 2(3), 2(4), and 33 absolutely prohibit any threat
or use of force not specifically justified by the article 51 right of individual or collective self-defense. Furthermore, pursuant to article 38(1)(c) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, under "the general prinnations," retaliation is not self-deciples of law recognized by civilized
12
fense but murder and aggression.

0

Case12

The Corfu Channel
invokes the memory of one of history's
great conflagrations that started as a simple dispute over the colonial status of Epidamnus between ancient Corinth and Corcyra, then a city-state
on the island of Corfu.'8 0 The Reagan Administration's demented interpretation of self-defense to include retaliation was a throwback to the
Athenian position taken at the Melian Conference in Book 5 of Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War: "The strong do what they will, and the
weak suffer what they must!"' 13 Not coincidentally, the Athenians had
rejected a Melian offer of neutrality in their war against Sparta as incompatible with their imperial destiny:
Melians.-"So that you would not consent to our being neutral,
friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side."
Athenians.-"No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your
friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your
enmity of our power."
Melians.-"Is that your subjects' idea of equity, to put those who have
nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are most
of them your own colonists, and some conquered rebels?"
Athenians.--"As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as
the other, and that if any maintain their independence it is because they
are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are afraid;
so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security by your
subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more important
that you should not succeed in baffling
'
1 32
the masters of the sea.

Twenty-five hundred years later, today's master of the sea is another selfstyled democracy with a belligerent populace and truculent leaders who
imperiously threatened to engulf the civilized world in a cataclysm of unpredictable dimensions if a small power did not capitulate to its diktat.
128. The Statute of the International Court of Justice (June 26, 1945), 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993.
129. Corfu Channel (U.K v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
130. THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THUSYDIDES: THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (Madean Library ed. 1951).
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An alternative solution existed, however, to the Reagan Administration's fictitious dilemma of choosing between further escalation of direct
United States military intervention in support of Iraq, or installing a
puppet regime in Baghdad acting at the behest of Iran. This third option
could be constructed on the basis of international law and organizations if
the Reagan Administration or its successor really desired.to do so in good
faith. Pursuing this third alternative essentially would have required that
the United States government indicate a willingness to satisfy those reasonable Iranian conditions for terminating the war that can be fully justified by the principles of international law.
The basic components of and reasons for a practicable peace plan that
merit support by the United States government and endorsement by the
U.N. Security Council are: (1) the condemnation of Iraq as the original
aggressor in the war; (2) the removal of Saddam Hussein from power; (3)
the payment of war reparations to Iran; (4) the interposition of a United
Nations peacekeeping force along the Iraq-Iran border to facilitate a
withdrawal of forces; and, (5) the restoration of the 1975 border between
the two countries. 8 Iran gave every indication that it would be prepared
to terminate the Iran-Iraq War on essentially these terms.
Instead of working along these lines, however, the Reagan Administration sponsored and obtained the passage of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 598 (1987)184 that did not meet any of the minimal
Iranian demands for the termination of the war, but rather seemed to
incorporate the maximalist Iraqi position. In particular, Resolution 598
required that Iran must first withdraw from all Iraqi territory before
steps are taken by the Security Council to satisfy any of the legitimate
Iranian conditions under international law. M The United States government's stubborn insistence that the terms of Resolution 598 be implemented in this precise sequence of events was an obvious nonstarter in
the first place and was thus probably designed to produce Iranian noncompliance in order to serve as a pretext for imposing United Nations
Security Council sanctions against Iran to stave off an Iraqi defeat.
It was seriously doubtful that after seven years of being on the receiving end of incredible'bloodshed and devastation, Iran would withdraw
from Iraq upon the mere promise by the Security Council that the inequities of the situation might be redressed somewhat afterwards. Recall that
due to the influence of the United States government, the United Nations
Security Council had yet to pass a resolution even condemning Iraq for
133.
134.
I.L.M.
135.
I.L.M.
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initiating aggression against Iran in 1980, with all its incalculable consequences for the Iranian and Iraqi peoples. Under the pernicious influence
of the Reagan Administration, Resolution 598 also failed to accomplish
this. The supposed reason was. that -the Security Council must be balanced and even-handed between both belligerents when passing resolutions on the Persian Gulf War.' Nothing should be further from the
truth.
The Security Council was never designed to be neutral in the face of
outright aggression.157 If the Security Council purported to be so for any
reason, then the Security Council and its membership-especially the five
permanent members possessing veto power (i.e., United States, the
United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, and
China)-simply betrayed their partiality in favor of an aggressor against
its victim and thus seriously undermined, if not permanently abnegated,
their "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security" under United Nations Charter article 24(1)."' So long as
the Security Council continued to act at the behest of the United States
government and Iraq in this matter, it would probably have had little
positive effect upon the ultimate outcome of the Iran-Iraq War.
Despite these inherent defects, Iran nevertheless demonstrated a considerable amount of flexibility on the terms and the timing for the implementation of Resolution 598. The Iranians indicated that they would be
prepared to declare and observe an informal cease-fire that should be followed by the establishment of an international commission to examine
responsibility for the outbreak of the war. Once that commission had
made its report-presumably determining that Iraq was responsible for
committing aggression-and the logical consequences from that determination were implemented (that is, the departure of Saddam Hussein and
at least a promise by Iraq and/or the Gulf states to pay war reparations
to Iran), then Iran indicated that it would be prepared to engage in a
complete withdrawal from Iraqi territory. The United States government
should have taken the Iranians' word and immediately proceeded to implement this promising procedure for ending the war.
Instead, the Reagan Administration continued to work at the Security
Council to obtain the latter's full support for the maximalist Iraqi position that Iran must first withdraw completely from Iraqi territory before
meeting any Iranian terms for ending the war. Later, the Reagan Administration demonstrated its own gross disrespect for and rank hypocrisy
136. Security Council called for cease fire in Iran-Iraq War, Press Release No. 162 (July
21, 1987), U.S.U.N. Press Release No. 37, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin 17
(Sept. 1987).

137. See supra text accompanying notes 41-'50.
138.

U.N.

CHARTER

art. 24,

1.

19921

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

toward Resolution 598 by specifically violating the terms of paragraph 5
thereof when it decided to use the United States Navy to escort the
Kuwaiti tankers and to engage in acts of hostility against Iranian ships
and oil drilling platforms in the Gulf: "The Security Council . . . . 5.
Calls upon all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain
from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the
conflict, and thus to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution . . . . " Direct United States military intervention in support of the
Kuwaiti tankers and retaliatory acts against Iranian ships and oil drilling
platforms did the exact opposite of what the Security Council had ordered. Next, the Reagan Administration sanctimoniously demanded that
the Security Council impose an arms embargo against Iran because it had
failed to comply with Resolution 598.140
Even if the Reagan Administration was ultimately successful in its
quest for Security Council sanctions against Iran, the sanctions would
probably have had a limited impact upon Iranian calculations because the
Security Council had no credibility in Iran's eyes. Furthermore, any additional forms of unilateral direct United States military intervention into
the Persian Gulf War were probably doomed to fail. The same can be said
for the American-orchestrated multilateral naval force consisting of warships drawn from NATO countries but operating without any type of imprimatur by the United Nations Security Council in the Persian Gulf.
Their propulsion into the Gulf War simply raised the specter of the multilateral force that the Reagan Administration had cajoled into Lebanon
without United Nations approval in order to provide a thin veneer of
multilateral protective cover to seduce the American people and Congress
into supporting the interjection of United States Marines into the Lebanese Civil War on the side of the Gemayel family.
The Reagan Administration surrendered the initiative for war and further acts of hostility to Iran as part of some cosmic game of "chicken,"
wherein the United States government publicly admitted that its military
calculations were based upon the assumption that Iran would not do
something foolish or irrational as the Reagan Administration defined
those terms. In other words, the American people must have depended
upon the good sense of Iran to keep the United States but of further involvement in the Iran-Iraq War. Only time will tell whether or not the
Reagan Administration's reckless gamble with the lives of United States
sailors and airmen and with the destiny of this country and its people will
pay off.
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The Reagan Administration's apparent resurrection of Thomas Schelling's discredited and dangerous theory propounding "the rationality of
irrationality" 14 1 as the basis for its interventiohary policy in the Iran-Iraq
War could have an incredible disaster for everyone concerned. As of this
writing, the disaster has not yet materialized-assuming that one is prepared to write off the thirty-seven dead crewmen of the U.S.S. Stark as
an "accident," which the author is not willing to do. One would hope that
the American people had seen quite enough of President Reagan on national television shedding crocodile tears over the bodies of American servicemen whom he had needlessly ordered to their deaths because of his
penchant to send in the Marines, Navy, Army, or Air Force, whenever his
illegal and bankrupt foreign policies have finally demonstrated their genetic futility. But as Machiavelli said in Chapter XVIII of The Prince:
.men are so simple-minded and so dominated by their present needs
that one who deceives will always find one who will allow himself to be
deceived. ' 142 This maxim seems to have been the guiding principle of the
Reagan Administration throughout its years in office. We will have to live
with it until the bitter end-whenever and whatever that might be.
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